One out of five entering public school teachers leave the field within the first 4 years. Despite that the presence of a newborn child is the single most important determinant of exits of female teachers, retention policy recommendations rely on models that take children as predetermined. This article formulates and estimates a structural dynamic model that explicitly addresses the interdependence between fertility and labor force participation choices. The model with unobserved heterogeneity in preferences for children fits the data and produces reasonable forecasts of labor force attachment to the teaching sector. Structural estimates of the model are used to predict the effects that wage increases and reductions in the cost of childcare would have on female teachers' employment and fertility choices. The estimates unpack important features of the interdependence of fertility and labor supply and contradict previous studies that did not consider the endogeneity between these two choices.
Introduction
One particular issue that has pervaded policy discussions for decades is the difficulty that US school districts experience in retaining teachers. One out of five entering public school teachers leave teaching within the first 4 years, citing "personal life factors" as the main reason why they voluntarily leave the job (Goldring et al., 2014; Gray and Taie 2015) . While there have been several areas of growth in the literature, one aspect that deserves particular attention is the role of family circumstances, such as maternity and marriage, in explaining teacher mobility patterns. The significance of these factors is consistent with the facts that women make up a dominant portion of total employment in elementary and secondary schools (76% in 2015 (76% in , NCES 2016 and that female teachers carry smaller wage penalties for labor force interruptions than women in other occupations (Flyer and Rosen 1997; Görlich and Grip 2009; Polachek 1981) .
One key question for investigation is, therefore, to what extent fertility is related to teacher mobility patterns and what role it plays at key points over the course of teachers' careers, i.e., attrition and potential return after a spell out of teaching. Another important question concerns the effects of retention policies on labor force attachment to the teaching sector. Answering these questions is relevant given the growing emphasis that school districts are placing on facilitating work and family life balance for young teachers, as well as the lack of empirical evidence on the effects of these efforts on retention. 1 Addressing these issues requires an understanding of the dynamics of female teachers' choices, how unobserved fertility preferences affect the sorting into different career paths, and how intermittency patterns, work decisions, and fertility choices interact with each other. This paper targets these questions by constructing and estimating a structural dynamic model that explicitly addresses the interdependence between fertility and labor force participation choices. The proposed model builds on the early works by Stinebrickner (2001a, b) by allowing the certified teacher to choose a labor activity from among a set of teaching, nonteaching, and leisure options. This paper, however, differs in the modeling approach toward fertility. While Stinebrickner (2001a, b) assumes fertility is exogenous or stochastic, I construct a dynamic setting that endogenizes fertility. Hence, this model integrates occupational and fertility choices into a female teacher's life cycle plan, where women with different taste toward childbearing opt for different occupations so as to balance their career path with family formation choices. With this framework, I generate predicted life-cycle trajectories for employment status, wages, and fertility that match the observed ones. The behavioral parameters of the model are recovered through the Method of Simulated Moments (MSM) using data from the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 (NLS-72) and are used to simulate the effects that potential wage changes and reductions in the cost of childcare would have on female teachers' employment and fertility decisions.
The joint nature of fertility and female labor supply decisions has long been recognized and discussed. 2 However, none of this literature pertains to teachers. 3 The issue of teachers and mobility takes on particular importance for two reasons. First, teaching has a relatively high turnover rate compared to other occupations (Harris and Adams 2007; Ingersoll 2001 Ingersoll , 2002 . The higher mobility observed among teachers remains when exits are associated with childbirth (Stinebrickner 2002) . Second, schools that experience high mobility appear to have lower student achievement (Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger 2008; Levy et al. 2012; Ronfeldt, Loeb, and Wyckoff 2013) . 4 The negative effect of childbearing on teacher employment has been described in both duration models (Flyer and Rosen 1997; Frijters, Shields, and Price 2004; Scafidi, Sjoquist, and Stinebrickner 2006; Stinebrickner 1998 Stinebrickner , 2002 and dynamic frameworks Stinebrickner (2001a, b) . However, while these studies are an important step forward, they assume that the presence of children is exogenous (with the exception of Stinebrickner 2001b, who models births stochastically), and thus have substantial limitations. First, they may overestimate the effect of children on attrition. 5 Second, they disregard the potential effects that policy initiatives may have on fertility. To the extent that fertility and employment are jointly determined, ignoring a channel through which policies may affect employment inevitably leads to inaccurate policy recommendations.
The structural model enables this article to disentangle and thus understand the true impact that labor and fertility decisions have on each other along teachers' career paths. Estimates indicate that gains of career interruptions due to childbirth vary between 83% and 98% of the teaching wage if departure occurs within five years after certification, and that reentry penalties for nonworking women with children lie between one and two times the teaching wage.
The results of this article are in stark contrast with the work by Stinebrickner (2001b) , whose estimates indicate that childcare subsidies would not be a cost effective policy when dealing with retention problems, given the large negative effect that children have on the utility of teachers. By allowing fertility and labor supply to be jointly determined, on the other hand, this study's estimates indicate that giving teaching-employed women subsidies to offset childcare costs would reduce fertility-related career interruptions, and thus contribute to increasing retention.
The presented policy simulations also illustrate how different fertility responses to exogenous changes in women's environments yield increases in retention. Wage increases have a negative effect on fertility, and thus decrease exits related to childbirth. Reductions in the cost of childcare, on the other hand, increase fertility and are shown to be effective in increasing job attachment to the teaching sector among beginner teachers as more teaching jobs and births are simultaneously chosen at early periods.
Previous research has established a strong and positive relationship between teacher pay and the length of time that teachers remain in their first teaching job. 6 Relatively few studies, however, have examined which factors affect teachers' decisions to return to the profession. Most of the work done on this topic has been limited to descriptive or analytical single-state studies, which used administrative data that contained no information about the labor force status of individuals after they left teaching, or about family formation variables (Beaudin 1993; DeAngelis and Presley 2007; Kirby, Grissmer, and Hudson 1991; Murnane, Singer, and Willet 1988; Plecki, Elfers, and Knapp 2006) . Only a few studies used longitudinal data containing family variables to explore the reentry decision Stinebrickner 2002) . None of these studies, however, established an empirical link between family-oriented policies and the potential decision to reenter the profession. 7 The remainder of this article is set out as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 introduces the data and describes the salient characteristics of the sample. The estimation methodology is presented in Section 4. The estimation results and the model fit are discussed in Section 5. The policy simulations are presented in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes.
The Dynamic Model
Each female teacher has a finite decision horizon beginning at age ( 0 ), the age she is the year after certification, and exogenously ending T years later. At each age t, she chooses whether she works in a teaching job or not, whether she works in a nonteaching job or not, and whether she has a child or not. A birth may occur in any period during the fertile stage, which exogenously ends at age 40. Therefore, a female teacher faces six mutually exclusive alternatives denoted by j: j = 1 if teaching and no birth; j = 2 if teaching and birth; j = 3 if nonteaching and no birth; j = 4 if nonteaching and birth; j = 5 if nonworking and no birth; and j = 6 if nonworking and birth. Let = 1 if alternative j is chosen at time t and = 0 otherwise. All alternatives are mutually exclusive, implying Σ 6 =1 = 1. At any age t, the objective of a particular female teacher is to maximize the expected present value of remaining lifetime utility,
with respect to , , and for ages = 0 , … , 40 and with respect to and for ages = 41, … , 0 + . The variables are defined as follows: is the level of goods consumption at t; is a dichotomous variable equal to unity if the female teacher works in a teaching job and equal to zero otherwise; is a dichotomous variable equal to unity if the female teacher works in a nonteaching job and equal to zero otherwise; = 1 indicates a birth at t and = 0 indicates no birth; represents the total number of children at age t; [0, 1] is the subjective discount factor; and is the expectations operator. 8 Per period utility at any age t, , is assumed to have the following form:
The disutilities of working in teaching and in nonteaching without children ( 1 and 2 , respectively), the direct utility obtained from having children ( ), and the difference in the disutilities of teaching and of nonteaching when having children instead of being childless ( 1 and 2 , respectively) are further parameterized as functions of age and the stock of children as follows:
Thus, the utility in eq. (2) is decreasing in and , reflecting disutility of working in teaching ( 11 < 0) and in nonteaching ( 21 < 0). Labor market decisions interact with age through 12 , 13 , 22 , and 23 . The parameters β capture the effects that children have on utility. I expect that a larger number of children provides a higher instantaneous utility ( 1 + 2 + 3 2 > 0) at a decreasing rate ( 4 + 5 + 6 2 < 0). The effect that children have on utility through their interactions with current participation is represented in the parameters γ. The disutility of working in both sectors when children are present is expected to be greater than the disutility of working while being childless. That is, I expect 1 and 2 < 0. This in turn implies that the marginal utility of children in the nonmarket alternative is expected to be greater than the gains of children in both teaching and nonteaching sectors.
I incorporate persistent unobserved individual differences in preferences for children following an approach similar to that proposed by Heckman and Singer (1984) . Specifically, unobserved heterogeneity arises in the utility function through 1 , allowing women to differ in their direct utility of children, . The distribution of the time-invariant heterogeneity component, 1 , is specified to be discrete joint multinomial. Accordingly, I distinguish between J 'types' of individuals where each type j, j = 1,…, J, is characterized by a different value of 1 . The population proportions of each type are given by
In the specification of the model I allow for two types of individuals, who differ in the values of 1 according to their preferences toward childbearing. 9 The proportions of women with low and high preferences for children are defined as
( 1 = 11 ) = 1 and ( 1 = 12 ) = 1 − 1 , respectively. The proposed model generates two different sources of children gains that depend on the number of children and the women's age. 10 The first one, "children premia," is relevant to understanding quitting behavior. It measures the gains that a teaching-employed woman receives if she keeps her current teaching job and gives birth, as well as the gains she receives if she leaves teaching and bears a child. 11 My results are expected to be consistent with previous literature that has found that attrition is positively related to childbirth. Thus, I expect the gain of dropping entirely out of the workforce to give birth to be greater than the gain of keeping a current teaching job and giving birth. Although the sign of the utility flows of switching to nonteaching associated with childbirth cannot be predetermined, it is expected that if positive, the gains of dropping out of the workforce entirely will be greater than the gains of switching to the nonteaching sector to give birth.
The second source of children gains, "occupation premia," measures the nonpecuniary gains of employment alternatives conditional on having children, and gives insight into two points. 12 First, it reflects how children affect the disutility of working. The disutility of teaching and nonteaching are expected to be greater with more children. Second, when evaluated at late periods, it measures the gains and losses of a reentry into teaching associated with prior fertility behavior. For instance, the gains of teaching relative to nonteaching reflect the rewards that an average former teacher with children and enrolled in a nonteaching job receives if she returns to teaching. The gains of teaching relative to the nonmarket alternative, on the other hand, provide information about the rewards incurred by a nonworking former teacher with children if she returns to teaching. 13 The choice decision in each period as described in eq. (1) is made subject to the woman's budget constraint, which is assumed to be satisfied period by period, and is given by:
where 1 and 2 denote the female teacher's wage earnings in teaching and nonteaching, respectively; 1 and 2 represent the corresponding fixed costs of work, and 3 is the goods cost per child. The female teacher's current earnings depend on the initial wage draw and age t. They are given by 14 :
where 1 and 2 are drawn from truncated lognormal wage offer
2 ), respectively. That is, when employed, the individual experiences wage growth as a function of age, which captures the accumulation of human capital over time. 15 The assumption that the female teacher does not carry over any debt incurred during one period to the next period is extreme. However, given that the instantaneous utility function in eq. (2) is linear and additive in consumption, the above optimization problem becomes a lifetime wealth maximization problem modified by the psychic value of children and work (Eckstein and Wolpin 1989; Francesconi 2002) .
The set of available employment options in a given year depends on the person's employment status in the previous year. If in − 1 the individual is employed as a teacher, in t she can continue working in her previously held job, accept a new nonteaching job offer drawn from the known wage offer distribution 2 (⋅), ( 2 ∈ ( 2, 2 ), 0 < 2 < 2 < ∞), or choose the nonmarket alternative. 16 Likewise, if in − 1 the person is employed in a nonteaching job, in t she can continue working in her previously held job, accept a new teaching job offer drawn from the known wage offer distribution 1 (⋅)( 1 ∈ ( 1, 1 ), 0 < 1 < 1 < ∞), or choose the nonmarket alternative. If in − 1 the person is out of the workforce, in t she receives a teaching job offer with probability ρ and a nonteaching job offer with probability 1 − . Both job offers are drawn from the known wage offer distributions 1 (⋅) and 2 (⋅), respectively. The person also has the option of staying out of the workforce.
Contraception is assumed to be perfect during the fertile stage and births are timed without error. The total number of children at age t, , is a time-varying predetermined state variable that evolves as = −1 + . At the time of each period's work decision the woman knows the value of her current occupation's base wage ( ) for l = 1,2, the distribution of the wage offer from the alternative occupation, and the wage structure in eq. (7), but does not know the future realizations of the wages in the alternative occupation.
The decisions made at age t depend on the fertility and employment histories up to that point in time. This history defines the state at which a female teacher starts a new period. The state space is denoted as
Let the value function (Ω ) be the maximal expected present value of lifetime utility as in eq. (1) given the woman's state Ω . The value function can be written as the maximum over alternative-specific value functions, that is,
and
where (⋅) is the value function if the female teacher chooses alternative j. Each of these alternative-specific value functions obey the Bellman equation (Bellman 1957) :
with j = 1,…,6 for = 0 , … , 40 and j = 1,3,5 for = 41, 0 + . The expectation in eq. (8) is taken with respect to the realization of the stochastic earnings conditional on Ω and = 1. Appendix A describes in detail the numerical solution of the model.
Data
The data come from the NLS-72. This survey collected longitudinal data on the post-secondary educational activities of 22,652 high school seniors who graduated in 1972 and included five additional follow-up surveys through 1986. For each person, the survey contains detailed information on the timing of employment spells and birth events. The analysis in this study will be restricted to the subsample of 405 female teachers who became certified to teach at some point between 1975 and 1985 and that had teaching experience after certification.
While the final 1986 follow-up survey was limited to only a subset of the original NLS-72 participants, the sample design oversampled teachers and potential teachers by including all those who had previously reported having completed teaching training. Therefore, the NLS-72 surveys combined provide a valuable source for the study of mobility patterns of a cohort of teachers.
17 A valid concern regarding my results is that the data represent preferences of teachers of several generations past. However, studies that used more current data illustrate that family circumstances remain important determinants of teacher mobility (Scafidi, Sjoquist, and Stinebrickner 2006 with data from the 1990s and Grissom 2012 with the NLSY-79, which contains information on workers throughout the 1980s and 1990s and into the 2000s).
18
In any given year, a woman is defined to be working if she is employed for more than 20 hours per week at any time between the first of November of the previous year and end of October of the current year.
19 A woman's wage earnings are defined as her weekly wage rate times 52 weeks. 20 She is defined to give birth in a given year if a birth occurs between the first of November of the previous year and end of October of the current year. For non-interview years, the employment and fertility histories were obtained using retrospective questions from the last follow-up survey. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the sample. The first observation year is the year following certification, and the last sample year is 1986. For the resulting unbalanced panel, the average sample member is observed for 10 years, resulting in 4,455 "person-years."
21 The majority of individuals in the sample do not have children when they initially become certified to teach. The average female teacher is 27 years old, has two children, and earns $303 per week in a teaching job and $296 per week in a nonteaching job. Nonteaching earnings are more dispersed than teaching earnings, reflecting the fixed structure of wages in the teaching sector. The lower part of Table 1 further shows that of the 4,455 person-years, 53% are spent in teaching without giving birth, 5% in teaching giving birth, 13% working in nonteaching without giving birth, 1% in nonteaching giving birth, 12% not working and not giving birth, and 3% not working and giving birth. Figure 1 illustrates how the employment participation rates of female teachers changes over time after certification and provides some descriptive insight into the extent of and reason for teacher attrition. During years of decline in teaching participation, the participation rate in nonteaching occupations remains largely unchanged, suggesting that a large increase in the proportion of women who are out of the workforce plays a more important role in the declining teaching participation rate. Table 2 shows the evolution of employment rates and employment transitions, as well as wages 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 years after certification. Employment distributions correspond to the participation rates shown in Figure 1 . Increasing birth rates complement the trends observed in the employment distributions and support the view of thinking of attrition as a fertility-related event. Moreover, the fact that birth rates increase in mid-career years while departures from teaching to the nonmarket alternative decrease suggests that births are likely to occur within one or two years after dropping out of teaching. Other employment transitions give some insight into reentry behavior. Higher transition rates into teaching in early years reflect the fact that some individuals do not work as teachers right after certification, 22 and also suggest that reentry into teaching after a career interruption is not very likely to occur. The large share of women who keep their nonteaching job from the previous period, as well as the large proportion of nonworking women who remain out of the workforce the following period, suggest that once individuals leave teaching, they are less likely to return. 23
Estimation
The estimation strategy is designed to recover the behavioral parameters of the theoretical model. I use the starting point of each individual in the data as the starting point of individuals in my simulated sample, which is composed of 20 "copies" of every individual in the data. Overall, I simulate 89,100 career and fertility paths. 24 Consider a woman who, one year after becoming certified to teach, begins her working career at age 0 . Given her state space, Ω , the woman draws a random shock from 1 (⋅) or 2 (⋅), calculates the six current utilities and the alternative-specific value functions, and chooses the alternative that yields the highest value. The state space is then updated according to the alternative chosen, and the process is repeated. Exact numerical solution is carried out by backward induction (value function iterations). Agents solve the dynamic problem with a finite horizon T = 40. 25 The solution to the optimization problem serves as the input into estimating the structural parameters of the model given data on choices and earnings. From the alternative-specific value functions, all structural parameters can be estimated, except that the utility parameters 11 , 12 , 4 , and 1 , 4 , 1 , for l = 1,2, cannot be distinguished from the budget parameters f due to data limitations. The identifying restriction is then 1 = 2 = 3 = 0. This implies that 1 for l = 1,2 should be interpreted as the gross costs of work (normalized to dollars), while the β and γ parameters measure the value of children net of the goods cost of children. 26 The model is estimated using the MSM (see Pakes and Pollard 1989; Duffe and Singleton 1993) . Based on an initial set of parameters, I solve the dynamic programming problem and then simulate paths of employment and fertility. The simulated data provide a panel dataset used to construct moments that can be matched to moments obtained from the observed data. Using a quadratic loss function that measures the distance between the observed and simulated moments, the parameters of the model are then chosen such that the simulated moments are as close as possible to the observed moments. The parameters to be estimated are
The moments used in this estimation are the cell-by-cell probability masses for the following distributions:
1. employment status (3 moments × 11 years), 2. wage levels (4 moments × 11 years), Thus, there are 421 moments to estimate 35 parameters. The MSM procedure relates a parameter set to a weighted measure of distance between sample and simulated moments:
where Δm is the distance between each sample and simulated moment and W is a weighted matrix. In this study, W is an identity matrix and each moment is weighted the same. The estimated behavioral parameters are thus * = argmin ( ). The function is minimized using Powell's method Powell (1964) , which requires function evaluations, not derivatives. Table 3 presents the estimates and asymptotic standard errors of the structural parameters assuming a discount factor, δ, of .95. Teaching jobs present a lower mean and standard deviation of the log-wage offer distribution than nonteaching jobs. These parameters imply an estimated mean yearly wage offer for teaching jobs of $10,043 and of $10,574 for nonteaching jobs. The wage growth parameters show that wages grow at a declining rate for both teaching and nonteaching occupations. The nonpecuniary parameter estimates seem to be consistent with others available in the literature. For example, participation decreases utility ( 11 and 21 < 0 ), particularly in nonteaching employment. Francesconi's (2002) and Eckstein and Wolpin's (1989) estimates also indicate a disutility of working for a sample of married women observed between 1968 and 1991, and between 1967 and 1982, respectively. 27 Using NLSY data, Sheran (2007) also finds that the utility of women decreases with a full time job.
Results

Parameter Estimates
As expected, estimates show that marginal utilities are positive and diminishing in children ( 11 , 12 , 2 , 3 > 0 and 4 + 5 + 6 2 < 0∀ ), vary across types substantially, and are always greater in the nonmarket alternative. 28 For instance, the monetary (utility) value of the first child in the nonmarket alternative for a woman at age 23 is estimated to be $560 for women with low taste for children (LF) and $602 for women with high taste for children (HF). A second child would decrease these gains at the same age to $146 and $188 for women with low and high preferences toward children, respectively. The corresponding gains of the first child in the nonteaching sector for LF and HF women are, respectively, $382 and $425. The gains in the same sector of a second child are $85 and $128 for LF and HF women, respectively. The "penalty" of the first child in teaching at the same age is $98 for LF women and $56 for HF women. A second child increases these penalties for LF and HF women to, respectively, $1,089 and $1,046.
My results further reveal that children decrease the utility gains from working and are consistent with most studies of female labor supply (Francesconi 2002; Sheran 2007; and with those analyzing the labor market of teachers (Adda, Dustman, and Stevens 2017; Stinebrickner 2001a) . 29 Particularly, the first child increases the penalties for teaching and nonteaching-employed women of age 24 by $1,147 and $468, respectively. A second child would increase the corresponding penalty for teaching workers to $1,943 and decrease it for nonteaching workers to $146.
To illustrate the implications of these estimates on teachers' career mobility patterns, I discuss below estimates of the two premia defined in Section 2. They are calculated by averaging the utility flows over individuals and are presented in terms of the average teaching wage in order to facilitate economic interpretation. Table 4 displays the "children premia," utility flows of employment transitions from the teaching sector associated with childbirth. The first rows of the three blocks (rows 1, 4, and 7 in the table) measure the gains of starting and enlarging families in teaching. An average teacher does not have nonpecuniary incentives to bear children and keep her current teaching job. The corresponding loss, if the first birth occurs within five years after certification, does not exceed 10% of the teaching wage, but becomes more important in later periods. 30 Instead, an average teacher finds it rewarding to drop out of the workforce to give birth, regardless of her current number of children. The gains of a first birth within five years after certification in the nonlabor market alternative (relative to teaching) lie between 83% and 98% of the average teaching wage. Table 4 : Children premia (in terms of average teaching wage).
Number of years after certification The "occupation premia," the key measure in understanding reentry patterns associated with the presence of children, are presented in Table 5 . Provided a positive stock of children, former teachers employed in nonteaching jobs receive nonpecuniary gains upon reentry into teaching, whereas nonworking former teachers face penalties if they reenter teaching. For instance, the penalties associated with reentering teaching in period 8 for an average nonworking former teacher with one child are equivalent to 1.41 times the teaching wage. A reentry into teaching from the nonteaching sector in the same period and with the same number of children, on the other hand, yields gains equivalent to 42% of the average teaching wage. My estimates are consistent with those found by Stinebrickner (2001a, b) regarding the role of children in explaining teachers' quitting decisions: as families are created or enlarged, female teachers become less likely to be employed in teaching jobs and become more likely to drop out of the workforce altogether. The introduction of endogenous fertility in this model, however, opens up a new channel through which policies can affect retention outcomes. By allowing labor supply and fertility choices to be jointly determined, this study's estimates thus lead to different policy recommendations, as will be elaborated upon in Section 6. My estimates also allow us to understand how each choice affects the other not only within the early stages of a teacher's career, but also after a career interruption. Findings reveal that in late periods, after families have been created, the nonmarket alternative offers large nonpecuniary rewards in comparison to teaching, thus resulting in important penalties if nonworking teachers return to the profession. This outcome, combined with the gains of dropping out of the workforce due to childbirth, suggests that policy initiatives targeted to fertility choices will also generate changes in teachers' retention. Key results of the interdependence of fertility behavior and labor force attachment to the teaching sector are depicted in Table 6 . Using births within two years after exit as a measure of fertility-related career interruptions, Table 6 shows that teacher attrition is mostly a fertility-related event, especially for teachers exiting to the nonmarket option. Among leaving teachers, 66% give birth within two years after exit, and this percentage accounts for 81% and 50% among exiting teachers to the nonmarket alternative and the nonteaching sector, respectively. Furthermore, exiting teachers who leave for nonteaching and who drop out of the workforce differ in fertility behavior during their first teaching spell. Among exiting teachers who leave the workforce entirely, 18% accumulate children during their first teaching spell. This percentage accounts for only 8% among exiting teachers who enroll in a nonteaching job. Table 6 further illustrates that reentry into teaching is more likely to occur among former teachers who do not give birth during a spell out of teaching. The percentage of former teachers who return after a fertility-related career interruption is 11%, whereas 56% of former teachers who do not give birth within two years after exit return at some point. Since teachers exiting to the nonteaching sector accumulate fewer children during their careers than those who exit the workforce entirely, it is not surprising that the former are more likely to return than the latter (29% vs 19%, respectively). One point discussed in the literature is that after the child is old enough, the former teacher will return. Given the sample ends when most individuals are still fertile, it is not possible to account for the effect of children's age on a person's labor supply. However, this information is necessary to solve the value functions of forward-looking individuals who take into account that their young children will eventually become older. The estimates in this article are obtained using the assumption that school-age children have the same effect on nonpecuniary utility as younger children.
Model Fit
To formally examine the extent to which the model is able to capture changes in the behavior of women that take place after certification, the parameter estimates in Table 3 were used to compute the simulated participation rates that correspond to the descriptive (Figure 1 ). Figure 2 shows that the model very accurately predicts the decreasing teaching participation rate that is observed over time for women. It also accurately predicts that this decrease takes place almost exclusively because of an increase in the proportion of women who are out of the workforce. As an additional measure of goodness of fit, Table 7 presents the actual and predicted percentages of total person-years spent in each employment alternative, as well as the actual and predicted percentage of aggregate years in which a birth occurs. The dynamic model appears to fit the overall choices of the individuals in the sample very well. This is formally confirmed by chi-square goodness of fit test statistics which, at a 0.05 level of significance, do not lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis that the employment proportions generated by the model are the same as the employment proportions observed in the data. The model also predicts that the actual number of total person-years in which a birth occurs is the same, at the 0.05 percent level, as the predicted number of total person-years in which a birth occurs. Note: 2 = Σ( − ) 2 / , = number predicted and = actual number . χ (2,0.95) = 5.991; χ(1,0.95) = 3. 841.
Policy Simulations
To illustrate how relaxing the assumption of exogeneous fertility leads to different policy recommendations, I perform two simulations. First, as in Stinebrickner (2001b) , I raise the salary of all teachers by 20 percent. This uniform wage increase represents an increase in the pecuniary benefits of choosing a teaching job and is consistent with the current rigid wage structure in public schools. Second, I simulate reductions in the cost of childcare by increasing the utility of working in teaching jobs when children are present. 31 Specically, I simulate subsidies of $3,000 per year and $4,000 per year by changing the parameter γ 11 in table 3 from 113 to 3,113 and 4,113, respectively. 32 It is important to mention that the setting used by Stinebrickner (2001b) did not allow this author to simulate reductions in the cost of childcare. Consequentely, this author relies on his estimates of an increase in teaching pay to provide policy recommendations regarding childcare subsidies. This paper, on the other hand, empirically evaluates childcare policies with grounds on a setting that has been long recognized ideal while dealing with female labor decisions.
Rather than comparing the effects of these policies, the aim of these exercises is to illustrate the interdependence between family changes and employment decisions. In a setting where individuals simultaneously decide their fertility and labor force status, both policies have an impact on retention, measured as the percentage of aggregate years spent in teaching, and on fertility, measured as the average number of births per woman. From a policy point of view, however, we are not interested in teachers' fertility, and therefore the analysis below will focus on the main outcome of interest: retention. Changes in fertility will only be presented as they explain why retention has changed.
According to the US Bureau of the Census (2016), families with employed mothers spent, on average, $44 per week (approximately $2,200 per year), on childcare in 1986. Therefore, the changes in the cost of childcare that I simulate represent substantial reductions in the actual cost of childcare in the United States. Changes in the fiscal treatment of childcare costs over time allow us to further understand the magnitude of this study's second proposed policy. In 1954, a deduction for employment-related care expenses was established. The deduction became a credit in 1976, and in 1981 the limits were placed at $2,400 per year for a family with one child and at $4,800 per year for a family with two or more children.
The effects of both policies on the two outcomes are reported in Table 8 . A 20% raise in teaching pay increases retention by 17%, a result mainly attributed to a larger decrease in the aggregate years spent out of the workforce rather than to a decline in the proportion of years spent in nonteaching (49% and 15%, respectively). Figure 3 illustrates that wage increases yield employment flows between teaching and out of the workforce throughout the sample period, and that the impact becomes more pronounced as the number of years since certification increases. Furthermore, higher teaching earnings decrease the average number of births by 50%. The negative effect on fertility is in line with previous empirical findings (Adda, Dustman, and Stevens 2017; Doepke, Hazan, and Maoz 2015; Galor and Weil 1996; Hondroyiannis 2010; Siegel 2017 ). The incorporation of a fertility channel in this article leads to different policy implications from Stinebrickner's (2001b) work, in which a framework where births occur stochastically is used to study teacher attrition patterns. First, the negative impact that wage increases have on fertility (which was not accounted for by Stinebrickner 2001b) reinforces the positive impact that wage increases have on employment, and thus leads to a more accurate impact on retention. Second, Stinebrickner's (2001b) estimates indicate that a 20% increase in teaching wages leads to a very large decrease in the proportion of individuals who choose nonteaching jobs, but has small impacts on the proportion of individuals who are out of the workforce. He relies on this result to conclude that childcare subsidies (which increase net teaching wages) would not be a cost-effective way to deal with teacher retention problems. By jointly modeling fertility and labor supply, however, I find that the increase in retention achieved with wage increases is mainly explained by a decrease in the proportion of nonworking women (see Figure 3 and Table 8 ). From a policy standpoint this is important because it demonstrates that only models that explicitly consider the endogeneity of fertility and labor supply are able to predict changes in fertility-related career interruptions, and thereby account for the potential benefits of policies targeted toward fertility choices. In order to understand the forces behind the results in Table 8 , I present in Table 9 the effects of regime changes on several choice probabilities along teachers' career paths. Wage increases diminish the percentage of teachers leaving the field by 30% and are more effective in retaining those who would otherwise exit the workforce entirely than in retaining those who would enroll in nonteaching jobs. Moreover, the negative effect on fertility is more concentrated after career interruption and among those who exit to the nonteaching sector. Return time is the first year she is observed in a teaching job after a career interruption.
It is important to point out the implications of evaluating an increase in wages in a setting where the interdependence between employment and fertility decisions is taken into account. Fertility changes concentrated after a career interruption help explain the large effects on decreasing exits to the nonmarket alternative, and vice versa. Taking these two effects together, increasing wages reduces fertility-related career interruptions by 52%, which in turn changes the nature of the attrition problem in public schools. Unlike baseline results, leaving teachers respond to increasing wages by exiting more to the nonteaching sector than to the nonmarket alternative, resulting in exits out of teaching no longer associated with childbirth. I next examine how changes in attrition patterns affect reentry behavior. Table 9 shows that higher teaching earnings increase the proportion of returners from 24% to 47% and that the effect is more pronounced among former teachers with exits not associated with childbirth. From the analysis of employment and fertility changes above, these results suggest that higher teaching pay increases the attractiveness of the teaching sector as teachers simultaneously decrease their fertility.
The $3,000 and $4,000 annual reductions in the cost of childcare increase retention by 10% and 16%, respectively. Figure 4 allows for a closer examination of the impact on yearly work patterns and reveals that the higher proportion of teachers employed in teaching jobs responds mainly to employment flows from the nonmarket option. The proportion of individuals employed in the nonteaching sector barely responds to reductions in the cost of childcare at early and late periods, whereas the share of individuals in the nonmarket alternative decreases throughout the sample period. Furthermore, reductions in the cost of childcare increase fertility. Yearly choice patterns reveal that the effect is higher at earlier periods and more pronounced in the teaching sector. My finding is in line with that of Adda, Dustman, and Stevens (2017) , who show that women respond to a cash transfer at birth by having their children earlier. Table 9 further indicates that reductions in the cost of childcare prolong the first teaching spell (particularly for those exiting the workforce entirely) and slightly decrease the percentage of exiting teachers. This result, combined with increases in fertility concentrated at early periods, suggests that reductions in the cost of childcare are an important initiative in increasing job attachment among beginner teachers, particularly among those who would otherwise have a fertility-related career interruption.
Changes on the children premia provide some insights into this result. Reductions in the cost of childcare increase the gains derived from children in the teaching sector, and therefore decrease utility flows associated with leaving teaching due to childbirth. Figure 5 illustrates the effect of reductions in the cost of childcare on children premia. The gap between the gains of exiting teaching entirely due to childbirth and those of staying in teaching and giving birth significantly shrinks. Indeed, Figure 5 (b-c) illustrate that in early years, with a $4,000 reduction in the cost of childcare, the differences in gains associated with a second and third child are close to zero. 33 This result explains why starting teachers respond to reductions in the cost of childcare by, on average, staying longer in teaching while simultaneously having more children. Table 9 allows further examination of how reductions in the cost of childcare, by simultaneously increasing fertility and the duration of the first teaching spell, affect reentry propensities. On the one hand, increases in fertility lead to increases in reentry rates. On the other hand, longer first teaching spells, which decrease the number of years in which a return to teaching could be observed, undermine propensities for reentry. The fact that the group that exhibits the greatest change in the first teaching spell, those who drop out of the workforce entirely, also exhibits the smallest increase in reentry rates illustrates this point. However, this smaller reentry effect that reductions in the cost of childcare have on the group with longer first teaching spells does not mean that this policy is ineffective in promoting reentry into teaching. Forecasts of the model beyond the actual data, which allow for an analysis of return propensities over a longer time period, is a field for further research.
Changes in the occupation premia, shown in Figure 6 , provide further insight into reentry behavior. Reductions in the cost of childcare increase the gains associated with a return to teaching from the nonteaching sector and decrease the penalties associated with a return to teaching from the nonmarket option. Despite the increase in incentives associated with a return to teaching for nonworking women with children, results suggest that the large nonpecuniary rewards of the nonmarket alternative, combined with attrition rates concentrated at later periods, do not favor reentry into teaching. Although the policies are not comparable, this study illustrates the mechanisms through which different fertility responses lead to increases in retention. On the one hand, increasing wages yield gains in retention through lower attrition and higher return rates as teachers simultaneously decrease their fertility. Reductions in the cost of childcare, on the other hand, increase fertility and the length of the first teaching spell as teachers simultaneously increase births and choose teaching jobs at early periods.
Conclusions
This article has been concerned with the construction and estimation of a structural dynamic model of career and fertility choices that a female teacher makes over her lifetime. In this model, the individual's finite-horizon optimization problem constitutes a dynamic programming problem that can be solved by backward induction. I estimate the model using the MSM with data from the NLS-72. Self-selection among the joint employment and fertility choices, based on expected future utility and unobserved heterogeneity in preferences for children, is shown to be an important element in fitting the data on the fertility and participation choices of female public school teachers. The proposed model is able to match accurately the decreasing trend in the teaching participation rate occurring after certification and to predict that this decrease takes place almost exclusively because of an increase in the proportion of women who are out of the workforce. The model also confirms that the total person-years spent in each employment alternative as well as the aggregate years in which a birth occurs are the same, at the 0.05 level, as the employment proportions observed in the data and the actual number of total person-years in which a birth occurs. The estimates were used to predict changes in teachers' patterns of employment and fertility stemming from a uniform 20% increase in teaching wages and to reductions in the cost of childcare.
Estimates indicate that attrition is a fertility-related event that responds to nonpecuniary gains lying between 83% and 98% of the average teaching wage if the exit occurs within five years after certification. Children increase the disutility of working in teaching jobs, and thus reentry into teaching is more likely to occur among former teachers who do not give birth after exit. A reentry into teaching for an average former teacher with one child yields nonpecuniary gains that lie between 15% and 42% of the teaching wage if reentry occurs from the nonteaching sector, and nonpecuniary penalties that lie between one and two times the teaching wage if reentry occurs from the nonmarket alternative.
Increasing wages improves retention through lower attrition and higher reentry rates as teachers simultaneously decrease their fertility. The largest attrition effect is observed among those who would otherwise drop out of the workforce, resulting in an average exiting teacher being more likely to leave teaching for the nonteaching sector than for the nonmarket alternative. Consequently, fertility-related career interruptions decrease by 52%. Former teachers respond to higher earnings by returning to teach in higher proportions. The positive effect on return rates is more pronounced among former teachers with exits not associated with childbirth. This study's results shed light on new alternatives in dealing with retention problems. Unlike studies that take children exogenously or stochastically, this article finds that the gains in retention derived from wage increases respond to reductions in fertility-related career interruptions (and thus, in the proportion of nonworking women) rather than to a decline in the proportion of women employed in nonteaching jobs. This article, therefore, supports the view that policies that increase net teaching pay (such as childcare subsidies) would have important effects on retention.
Reductions in the cost of childcare of $3,000 and $4,000 increase retention by 10% and 16%, respectively. Both longer first teaching spells and higher reentry rates yield gains in retention. Fertility effects concentrated at early periods occur as teachers simultaneously choose teaching jobs resulting in longer first teaching spells. Large nonpecuniary benefits of the nonmarket alternative, however, seem to overcome the gains of returning to teaching when children are present, resulting in a greater impact on return rates among former teachers enrolled in nonteaching jobs rather than nonworking former teachers. 
